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WHOSE CRIME IS IT ANYWAY? THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
CRIME OF AGGRESSION
DREW KOSTIC*
INTRODUCTION
In the early hours of June 12, 2010, a vote was taken in Kampala,
Uganda that changed the face of international criminal law forever. It was
at this time that the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) came to a consensus regarding the definition of the crime of
aggression and the mechanism by which the ICC will eventually exercise
jurisdiction over it. However, the process of these negotiations was far
from straightforward; the final text of the amendments consisted of
numerous provisions and understandings in an attempt to appease the
concerns of the varying factions that had descended on Kampala for this
occasion. As a result, the text of the crime of aggression amendments
remains ambiguous with regard to both the definition of the crime as well
as its entry into force and exercise of jurisdiction provisions.
This paper seeks to parse through this ambiguity by addressing the
questions that will require resolution by the judges at the ICC. The first
section will provide a brief overview of the negotiations at Kampala as well
as discuss the final text that became the crime of aggression amendments to
the Rome Statute. The second section will analyze nine key questions that
have arisen regarding the elements of the crime as well as the ICC’s ability
to exercise jurisdiction over it and suggest how judges at the Court will
likely interpret the text when these situations come about. As the
amendments will not enter into force until January 1, 2017 at the very
earliest, this analysis will function as the beginning of a dialogue on these
topics in order to generate a consensus over their answers and provide for a
smooth transition into a new era of international criminal law.

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Colgate University, B.A. 2008. For
comments and suggestions, I thank Professor Charles Dunlap. I would also like to thank all the
participants at the 2010 Road From Kampala Conference. This Note is dedicated to Bruce and Kathie
Kostic.
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I. THE HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AMENDMENTS
A. The Rome Conference
On July 1, 2002 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
entered into force1 giving the Court jurisdiction over three of the four
crimes within its mandate.2 The fourth crime, the crime of aggression,
makes it a crime for an individual to wage an illegal war.3 Despite being
listed as one of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community,”4 this crime had been left undefined and without a mode for
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over it.5 This purposeful oversight was
done in order to placate countries that were hesitant about an international
institution having jurisdiction over such a controversial crime.6 This is not
to say that there had not been consensus as to the need for protection
against the crime of aggression; even at Nuremberg aggression had been
called the “supreme international crime”7 and this belief was very much
alive during the Rome Conference.8 However, the crime of aggression
imposes unique factors that are not present in the other three crimes under
the ICC’s jurisdiction.9 For instance, in determining if a war crime or crime
against humanity has occurred, the ICC does not account for military
deaths or civilian deaths, which are often considered “collateral damage;”10
however, both factors influence a determination as to whether a situation
constitutes an act of aggression.11 A more contentious problem, however, is
that a decision regarding a crime of aggression indirectly impacts the legal
sovereignty of a State as opposed to simply influencing the rights of the
accused.12 In this sense, more so than the other crimes enumerated in the
1. About the Court, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
About+the+Court/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(2), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 1 (2009).
4. Id. at pmbl.
5. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 162 (2008).
6. Id. at 170-71.
7. Jennifer Trahan, The Rome Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at
the Kampala Review Conference, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49, 50 (2011).
8. Jutta F. Bertram-Nothnagel, A Seed for World Peace Planted in Africa: The Provisions on the
Crime of Aggression Adopted at the Kampala Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, AFR. LEGAL AID Q., 9, 9-10 (Apr.-June 2010) (“[A]t the time of the
adoption of the Statute in 1998, the international community recognized the horror of the crime. . . .”).
9. Id. at 10-11.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 11.
12. See Robert Heinsch, The Crime of Aggression After Kampala: Success or Burden for the
Future?, 2 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 713, 722 (2010).
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Rome Statute, the crime of aggression carries with it a political aspect that
made the delegates at Rome uneasy.13
Instead, these delegates, aware of the fact that the entire process might
unravel if they forced the debate revolving around aggression,14 inserted
two provisions into the Rome Statute that bought some time before any
decisions had to be made. The first, Article 5(2), provided for the
possibility of including the crime of aggression into the Court’s mandate by
stating that “[t]he Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court
shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”15 The second, Article
123, as alluded to in Article 5(2), established a review conference at which
the Assembly of States Parties, the legislative branch of the Court, could
propose amendments to the Rome Statute.16 By expressly stating “[s]uch
review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in
article 5,” the drafters of the Rome Statute made it evident that the crime of
aggression would not be forgotten.17
B. The Kampala Conference
From May 31, 2010 until June 11, 2010 the Assembly of States Parties
held a review conference in Kampala, Uganda to assess the state of the
International Criminal Court and its foundational document, the Rome
Statute, pursuant to article 123.18 While the early days of the conference
were occupied with other tasks, the primary focus of most of the delegates
was on the crime of aggression.19 Luckily, between 1998 and 2010, much
had occurred behind the scenes to prepare for this event. The final act of
the Rome Conference had assigned a Special Working Group on the Crime
of Aggression (SWGCA) to “prepare proposals for a provision on
aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes of Aggression
and conditions under which the International Criminal Court shall exercise

13. See id. at 716-17.
14. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 22, 29 (1999).
15. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
16. Id. art. 123.
17. Id. art. 123(1).
18. See generally Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, ICC Doc. RC/9/11 (2010).
19. Roger S. Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Considered at the First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala 31 May-11 June 2010, 2
GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 689, 690, 692 (2010).
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its jurisdiction with regard to this crime.”20 As a result, by the time the
Kampala Conference had come about, much had been decided regarding
the elements of the crime. By 2010, SWGCA had been able to provide a
definition of the crime that seemed to generally be deemed agreeable.21
However, provisions regarding the entry into force of the amendments and
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime proved far more
contentious.22
Specifically, much of the disagreement amongst the delegates
revolved around two factors: (1) the level of involvement of the United
Nations Security Council in determining whether or not the ICC could
pursue an investigation into the crime of aggression and (2) the manner by
which the amendments should enter into force.23 Under the United Nations
Charter, the Security Council has a “monopoly on stating whether a
situation represents an act of aggression.”24 In line with this thinking, some
parties, namely permanent Security Council members France and the
United Kingdom,25 sought to delegate responsibility for the determination
of a crime of aggression solely to the Security Council.26 Other parties,
fearing the encroachment of the Security Council on the ICC’s
independence, sought to provide the option to pursue an investigation by
State Party referral or under the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers (i.e., at
the Prosecutor’s discretion) for the crime of aggression,27 as was the case
for the other crimes in the Rome Statute.28
On a much more technical level, the delegates also debated as to how
the proposed amendments would enter into force. While Article 5(2) states
“[t]he Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a
provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123,” it does not

20. Id. at 693.
21. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 719. This definition inevitably became Article 8bis which was
voted on as part of the amendment to the Rome Statute at Kampala. Clark, supra note 19, at 694.
22. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 719; see also Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1195-96 (2010).
23. See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 716.
24. Id.
25. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1201.
26. Jennifer Trahan, The New Agreement on the Definition of the Crime of Aggression,
http://www.mediafire.com/?yydmndtmmdw (last visited May 2, 2011).
27. Trahan, supra note 7, at 61.
28. Under the Rome Statute, the Court can gain jurisdiction over a crime through one of three
triggers: (1) A State Party may refer a crime committed on its territory, or committed by one of its
nationals, to the Court (State Party Referral); (2) the Prosecutor may investigate a crime committed the
territory of a State Party, or committed by one of its nationals (Proprio Motu Investigation); or (3) the
Security Council may refer a crime that has occurred anywhere in the world to the Court (Security
Council Referral). Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12-15.
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indicate under which subsection of Article 121 the amendments should
enter into force.29 Some argued that 121(3), which states “[t]he adoption of
an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a
Review Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a
two-thirds majority of States Parties,”30 should be the proper entry into
force proceeding because the crime of aggression was to be decided at the
Kampala Review Conference.31 However, this subsection only discusses
the “adoption” of amendments, while other subsections explicitly indicate
procedures for how amendments should “enter into force.”32 Other
delegates claimed the amendments should enter into force under Article
121(4),33 which states “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment
shall enter into force for all States Parties one year after instruments of
ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations by seven-eighths of them.”34 This interpretation gets
around the “adoption” limitation that was hampering the proponents of
Article 121(3), but its threshold of ratification by seven-eighths of the
States Parties seems unnaturally high given the fact that the crime of
aggression had already been defined as a crime under the Court’s
jurisdiction in Article 5.35
A third contingent contended that the more appropriate subsection was
Article 121(5), which reads:
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into
force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one
year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In
respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the
amendment when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its
territory.36

Proponents of this argument noted that, not only does the subsection
specifically use the language “enter into force,” but also deals specifically

29. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
30. See id. art. 121(3) (emphasis added).
31. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1196.
32. Id.
33. Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, May 31-June 11,
2010, Report of the Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 46, I.C.C. Doc. RC/9/11, Annex III
(2010) [hereinafter SWGCA Report].
34. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(4).
35. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1198.
36. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).
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with amendments to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8.37 Likewise, the second sentence
of the subsection contemplates the exercise of jurisdiction “regarding a
crime,” suggesting that Article 121(5) is the proper channel for
amendments to substantive crimes as opposed to procedural aspects of the
Rome Statute.38 However, with the new amendments entering as 8bis,
15bis, and 15ter, at least two, and arguably all three, of these amendments
would not fall under Article 121(5)’s purview of “amendments to articles 5,
6, 7, and 8.”39
Furthermore, Article 121(5)’s second sentence posed considerable
trouble when read along with Article 12(2), which defines the Court’s
ability to exercise jurisdiction over the crimes under its mandate.
According to Article 12(2), the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a
situation if either the territory on which the situation occurred belongs to a
State Party or if the accused is a national of a State Party.40 However,
Article 121(5)’s second sentence exempts non-ratifying States Parties—or
those States that have ratified the Rome Statute but not the amendments—
from the Court’s jurisdiction if the situation occurs on its territory or its
national is accused of committing the crime.41 These articles present a
problem if a ratifying State Party’s national commits a crime of aggression
on a non-ratifying State Party’s territory, or vice versa. According to
Article 12(2), the ICC should have jurisdiction over the situation, but
according to Article 121(5)’s second sentence, the ICC should not.42
Attempts to square this discrepancy lead to two different
interpretations. Those advocating a “negative understanding” claimed the
second sentence indicated the Court could only exercise jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression under Article 12(2) if both the victim and the
perpetrator had accepted the amendment.43 Critics of this “negative
understanding,” however, argued that this interpretation would give nonratifying States Parties an unfair advantage over non-States Parties or those
37. See Trahan, supra note 7, at 65.
38. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1196-98.
39. Trahan, supra note 7, at 65. Some contend that 8bis is actually an entirely new article
somewhere between Article 8 and 9. Id. at 65 n.66.
40. Article 12(2) states:
In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of
the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court . . . : (a) The
State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board
a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the person
accused of the crime is a national.
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(2).
41. Id. art. 121(5).
42. Compare id. art. 12(2), with id. art. 121(5).
43. See SWGCA Report, supra note 33, at 46.
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States that have not ratified the Rome Statute at all.44 If a “negative
understanding” were to be read into Article 121(5) then a non-ratifying
State Party could attack a ratifying State Party with immunity because its
nationals would be exempt from prosecution under Article 121(5).45
However, if a non-State Party were to do the same, because the crime
would occur on the territory of the ratifying State Party, the crime would
fall under the Court’s jurisdiction according to Article 12(2).46
Others advocated for a “positive understanding;” this approach
suggested that the second sentence should only be read as to put nonratifying States Parties in the same position as non-States Parties with
regard to Article 12(2).47 In this way, a ratifying State Party need only be
either the victim state or the aggressor for the Court to exercise
jurisdiction.48 Critics of this position noted that it is hard to square this
interpretation with the actual language of Article 121(5), which clearly
states that, when a State Party does not ratify the amendments, “the Court
shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the
amendment[s] when committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its
territory.”49
Out of this debate came two main proposals at Kampala: one from
Argentina, Brazil, and Switzerland (the ABS Proposal) and one from
Canada (the Canadian Proposal).50 The ABS Proposal presented a unique
split of Article 121(5) and 121(4) as a solution to the problem of Security
Council control.51 This proposal provided different entry into force
mechanisms for the different triggers under which the Court may exercise
its jurisdiction; one entry into force mechanism would apply to crimes of
aggression that are referred to the ICC by the Security Council while
another would apply to those that result from State Party referrals and
proprio motu investigations. The crime of aggression would enter into
force for all Security Council referrals under the rules found in the first
sentence of Article 121(5).52 In other words, one year after a state ratified
the amendments, the Security Council would have the authority to refer,
44. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1197.
45. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).
46. Id. art. 12(2).
47. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1197.
48. SWGCA Report, supra note 33, at 46.
49. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5) (emphasis added).
50. See Trahan, supra note 7, at 68, 72 (“The Slovenian Proposal did not appear to significantly
alter the mix.”).
51. See Laura Marschner & Isabelle Olma, The First Review Conference of the International
Criminal Court, 9 ZEITSCHRIFT INTERNATIONALE STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK 529, 532 (2010).
52. Id.
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and the ICC would have the authority to exercise jurisdiction over, a crime
of aggression in that State or committed by its nationals. However, the
crime of aggression, with regard to State Party referrals and proprio motu
investigations, would enter into force under Article 121(4), meaning seveneighths of the States Parties had to ratify the amendments for the Court to
exercise jurisdiction over the crime under these triggers.53 While this
proposal “received much praise for its ingenuity” and influenced proposals
to come, it still lacked support due to its heavy reliance on Article 121(4)
and the unnatural seven-eighths threshold that it requires.54
Later in the conference, the Canadian delegation responded to the
ABS faction with a proposal of its own.55 Unlike the ABS Proposal, the
Canadian paper suggested the amendments enter into force using a
modified “negative understanding” of Article 121(5). Under this regime, if
the Security Council had not made a determination regarding a potential
crime of aggression within six months, the Prosecutor could open an
investigation under his proprio motu powers as long as the Pre-Trial
Chamber of the ICC had authorized it and “all state(s) concerned” or “the
state on whose territory the alleged offence occurred and the state(s) of
nationality of the persons accused” consented to the proceedings.56 Yet, as
with the ABS Proposal, the Canadian Proposal had its own critics, many of
whom worried about whether it was realistic to believe that all the parties
to a dispute surrounding an act of aggression would submit themselves to
the ICC’s jurisdiction.57
As the clock wound down on the conference with no clear consensus
in sight, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser, President of the Assembly of
States Parties, presented a “non-paper”58 of his own, which attempted to
bridge the growing rift between the factions.59 Specifically seeking to
entice the skeptical permanent members of the Security Council, President
Wenaweser’s non-paper mandated that the amendments not enter into force

53. See Robert L. Manson, Identifying the Rough Edges of the Kampala Compromise, 21 CRIM. L.
F. 417, 421 (2010).
54. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1202-03.
55. Id. at 1203.
56. Trahan, supra note 7, at 70-71.
57. Id. at 71.
58. A non-paper, or an aide-mémoire, is “a proposed agreement or negotiating text circulated
informally among delegations for discussion without committing the originating delegation's country to
the contents.” Aide-Mémoire Law & Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, http://definitions.uslegal.com/
a/aide-memoire/ (last visited April 26, 2011).
59. William A. Schabas, New ‘Non-Paper’ Advances Search for Consensus on Aggression, THE
ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE: KAMPALA 2010 (June 10, 2010, 3:02 PM), http://iccreviewconference.
blogspot.com/.
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until the ratification of thirty States Parties.60 Furthermore, at least one year
after the thirtieth ratification, and no sooner than January 1, 2017, another
vote would have to be taken by the Assembly of States Parties as a whole
before the amendments would come under the Court’s jurisdiction.61 To
address those States Parties wary of the Security Council monopoly,
President Wenaweser’s non-paper allowed for State Party referrals and
proprio motu investigations without requiring express Security Council
permission.62 Instead, President Wenaweser tempered these modes of
exercising jurisdiction by instituting four filters: (1) the Security Council
must take no action regarding the situation in question for six months; (2)
after six months has elapsed, the Pre-Trial Chamber must grant
authorization with regard to a State Party referral or a proprio motu
investigation; (3) States Parties must be allowed to formally “opt out” of
the amendments after ratifying them, and thereby prevent the Court from
exercising jurisdiction over their nationals and territory; and (4) the ICC
may not exercise jurisdiction over non-States Parties at all.63 These filters
sought to protect the ICC’s independence while simultaneously moderating
when the Court could exercise its control over the crime.
Around 12:20 a.m., just minutes into June 12, 2010, the President
brought his final proposal to the delegates for a vote, which was passed by
a consensus.64 After years of definitions, discussions, and debates it was at
this point that the crime of aggression amendments to the Rome Statute
became a reality.
C. The Final Agreement
1. The Elements of the Crime
While the United Nations praised the agreement at Kampala as
“historic” and a significant step toward a new “age of accountability,”65 the
final Articles 8bis, 15bis, and 15ter operate largely as a compromise
between the many interests expressed at Kampala.66 Article 8bis, which
encapsulated the elements of the crime of aggression, is divided into two

60. Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1207-08.
61. Id. at 1208.
62. See id.
63. Trahan, supra note 7, at 80.
64. Id. at 82.
65. Carsten Stahn, The ‘End’, The ‘Beginning of the End’ or the ‘End of the Beginning’?
Introducing Debates and Voices on the Definition of ‘Aggression’, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 875, 875
(2010).
66. Trahan, supra note 7, at 82.
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paragraphs.67 The first paragraph defines the crime of aggression, or the
individual responsibility that must be tied to an act of aggression. It states
that the accused must engage in the actions of “planning, preparation,
initiation or execution” to be liable for the crime, echoing the elements of
the definition of “waging a war of aggression” used at Nuremberg.68 This
paragraph also emphasizes that an individual must be in a “leadership”
position while committing the crime, mandating that the accused be a
person “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State.”69 Finally, this paragraph mandates
that the leader must have control over “an act of aggression which, by its
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter
of the United Nations.”70 The second paragraph, on the other hand, deals
with what constitutes an actual act of aggression, or what physical actions
can be deemed aggressive. This section draws heavily from United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX)71 by reciting the text of its
third article verbatim and explicitly referencing that any act of aggression
be found “in accordance” with the resolution.72 The reasoning behind this
approach seems simple: having not had a codified definition for the act of
aggression since Nuremberg, the use of a definition that had support in the
United Nations seemed the safest course to follow in order to satisfy all the
delegates.73
While Article 8bis remained relatively untouched throughout the
proceedings at Kampala, the final text of the definition also included a
series of seven Understandings, supported by the delegations from Canada
and the United States, in an attempt to clarify the boundaries of the crime.
One of the United States’ main concerns was the fear that the amendments
would “criminaliz[e] lawful uses of force.”74 To protect against this
possibility, the United States proposed the inclusion of Understanding 6,
67. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 720.
68. Id. at 721.
69. Id. at 721-22.
70. Resolution Adopting Aggression Amendments to Rome Statute, Rev. Conf. of the Rome
Statute, Kampala, Uganda, May 31-June 11, 2010, Annex I, art. 8bis(1), 13th plen. mtg., I.C.C. Doc.
RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter The Amendments].
71. This resolution, passed in 1974, articulates a definition of the Crime of Aggression. See
Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc.
A/9890, at 142 (Dec. 6, 1974) [hereinafter Definition of Aggression].
72. Id.; Heinsch, supra note 12, at 723.
73. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 725.
74. Julia Martínez Vivancos, The Crime of Aggression Amendment Adopted at the ICC Review
Conference in Kampala, Uganda, THE AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COALITION
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (July 29, 2010), http://www.amicc.org/docs/
Aggression.pdf.
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which stated that aggression was the “most serious and dangerous form of
the illegal use of force” and that a determination regarding whether an act
of aggression has occurred “requires consideration of all the circumstances
of each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their
consequences, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”75
Canada, however, expressed concern over the fact that the amendments
could be interpreted to indicate that an act of aggression could be a
manifest violation of the United Nations Charter if it was “manifestly
illegal” with regard to just one of the components of character, gravity, or
scale.76 The Canadians feared that this situation might arise “in a case
where one component is most prominently present, but the other two are
completely absent.”77 It was at this delegation’s request that Understanding
7 came into being, which stated that, in analysing whether the act of
aggression is a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter, “the three
components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a
‘manifest’ determination.”78 Understanding 7 went on to further clarify that
“[n]o one component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest
standard by itself,”79 indicating that at least two of the components must be
present for an act of aggression to be deemed a manifest violation of the
United Nations Charter.
2. The Entry Into Force and Jurisdiction Structure of the Crime
The entry into force and jurisdictional regime for the crime of
aggression is split into two amendments: Article 15bis, which deals with
State Party referrals and proprio motu investigations, and Article 15ter,
which deals with Security Council referrals. As a prerequisite, the
introductory paragraph of the amendments indicates that they shall enter
into force following the protocol outlined in Article 121(5).80 In addition to
the requirements under this article, however, Article 15bis also incorporates
the delay period rule addressed in the non-paper offered by the President at
Kampala. It requires thirty State Party ratifications and a two-thirds
majority approval at a revote that can occur no earlier than January 1, 2017
for the amendments to enter into force.81 Further borrowing from the
President’s non-paper, with regard to jurisdiction, Article 15bis allows for a

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex III, para. 6 (emphasis added).
Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1206.
Id.
The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex III, para. 7.
Id.
Id. at para. 1.
Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(2)-(3).
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State Party to ratify the amendments and then “opt out” of the Court’s
jurisdiction over its territory and nationals.82 It likewise provides a
mandatory six-month delay period between the Prosecutor notifying the
Secretary General of the United Nations of his intent to investigate an act
of aggression and his actual ability to do so.83 This delay mechanism is
presumed to allow ample time for the Security Council to make its own
determination regarding the situation before the Court can act
independently. However, unlike the non-paper, before engaging in an
investigation under his proprio motu powers, the Prosecutor need not seek
authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber but instead must be authorized
by the entire Pre-Trial Division.84 In this sense, the Prosecutor must
convince the majority of a six-judge panel as opposed to a panel composed
of only three.85 Arguably the most important portion of this Article,
however, is 15bis(5), which states that, with regard to “a State that is not a
party to this Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression when committed by that State’s nationals or on its
territory.”86 This provision, ostensibly, exempts any act of aggression from
being prosecuted if it occurs on a non-State Party’s territory or has been
committed by one of its nationals.87 While Article 15bis incorporates these
numerous requirements and loopholes, Article 15ter is far more
straightforward; it simply states that the Court may exercise jurisdiction in
accordance with Article 13(b),88 the provision of the Rome Statute that
gives the Court the authority to exercise jurisdiction over situations that are
“referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”89
Though the delegates in Kampala came to a consensus over the crime
of aggression amendments, a plethora of questions still remain regarding
their use in the courtroom. As President Wenaweser remarked, even at the
Kampala Conference itself, “[t]here was a certain level of understanding
for the concerns advanced [by critics], but the view prevailed that
reopening the definition would inevitably lead to its total unraveling.”90
While this refusal to open the “Pandora’s box” of criticism surrounding the
82. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).
83. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(6)-(8).
84. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(8).
85. Trahan, supra note 7, at 80 n.130.
86. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(5).
87. Trahan, supra note 7, at 84.
88. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15ter(1).
89. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
90. Christian Wenaweser, Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s
Perspective, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 883, 883 (2010).
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crime of aggression was the very reason the delegates were able to achieve
a consensus at Kampala, it has also left numerous questions and concerns
for the judges of the ICC to interpret. The second section of this paper
seeks to address these questions and concerns by first raising and analyzing
them and then positing the likely interpretations judges will formulate
when applying these amendments in the courtroom. It will do so in two
parts: Part II.A will deal with the questions surrounding Article 8bis and
the elements of the crime while Part II.B will assess Articles 15bis and
15ter and the questions arising from the entry into force of the amendments
as well as the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. While the text of
the amendments was solidified last summer in Kampala, it is not without its
ambiguities; as a result, these inquires must be considered in order to
ensure a smooth transition into this new stage of international criminal law.
II. QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
AMENDMENTS
A. Questions Surrounding Article 8bis and the Elements of the Crime
1. What Is the Meaning of “Effective Control” Under Article 8bis?
Article 8bis defines the crime of aggression as “the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a
State.”91 While a leader’s ability to “direct the political or military action of
a State,” for the most part, can be rather easily assessed, the same cannot be
said for a leader’s ability to “effectively” exercise control. Generally a
leader is thought to be the political figurehead of a country such as a
president, dictator, or king. However, in an expanding global economy,
business leaders exercise more and more influence over the economic
survival of countries.92 Likewise, one might plausibly see other
figureheads, such as religious leaders, exercising a considerable amount of
control over a country’s laws and policies. As a result, one might make an
argument that these business and religious leaders then “effectively”
exercise control for their respective countries. While the history of the
crime of aggression amendments points in this direction, it is somewhat
91. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(1) (emphasis added).
92. See RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL CORPORATIONS
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 14 (1994) (“The architects and managers of these space-age business
enterprises understand that the balance of power in world politics has shifted in recent years from
territorially bound governments to companies that can roam the world. As the hopes and pretensions of
governments shrink almost everywhere, these imperial corporations are occupying public space and
exerting more profound influence over the lives of ever larger numbers of people.”).
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inconclusive. During World War II it was accepted that German
industrialists could be prosecuted for waging an “aggressive war” if they
had the economic means to “support, or help to prepare” the war.93
However, none were actually convicted.94 Furthermore, while the crime of
aggression is based on this precedent, the charge used at Nuremberg was
technically not the same crime.95 As a result, the question begs to be asked:
what types of leaders – whether formal State officials or private actors –
will be liable for the crime of aggression?
It is likely that a judge faced with unofficial leaders will still find them
prosecutable for the crime of aggression. Scholars analyzing the elements
of the crime have suggested that the focus for determining whether an
individual can be prosecuted for the crime of aggression should be on the
leadership component of the definition.96 In other words, a judge faced with
this scenario should focus on whether the accused was in a position of
representation for the state, regardless of whether that position was
formal.97 However, while unofficial leaders that commit an act of
aggression might be liable under this analysis, it is less likely that they will
actually be convicted and sentenced than would be the case for official
leaders. One factor that points to this hypothesis is Article 8bis(2)’s heavy
focus on “armed force” in its definition of an act of aggression. This
subsection states that an act of aggression must be “the use of armed force
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State.”98 While some have criticized this phrasing
as being too narrow to include the dangers of modern warfare,99 in the
present scenario, it is a system of delineation for a judge to use when
determining if a leader exercises control to the requisite degree.100 Because
of the need for there to be armed force to constitute an act of aggression, an
unofficial leader must exercise control over the armed forces of a country
to become criminally liable. This requirement makes it quite unlikely,
93. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 722.
94. Clark, supra note 19, at 697.
95. At Nuremberg it was called “waging a war of aggression” while the ICC has jurisdiction over
the “crime of aggression.” See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 721.
96. Noah Weisbord, Professor of Law, Fla. Int’l Univ., Address at The Road From Kampala
Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC Review Conference of the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010),
available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts (part 1).
97. See id.
98. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2) (emphasis added).
99. Telephone Interview with Don Ferencz, Convener, Global Institute for the Prevention of
Aggression, (Mar. 31, 2011) (noting that, with a cyber-attack, one could wipe out an entire State’s
infrastructure, leading to far graver consequences than armed conflicts that might fall under the current
definition of aggression).
100. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 723.
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though still feasible, that an individual of this nature could be charged with
the crime of aggression. Interestingly, however, with the development of
religious extremism in the Middle East, it is not implausible for a judge to
perceive a religious leader to not only impact the politics of a state,101 but
presumably the military actions of one as well. Article 8bis(1)’s definition
of “effective control,” while potentially too narrow to capture leaders that
lack access to armed forces, is still wide enough to capture those leaders
who gain this access informally and indirectly.
2. What Constitutes a Manifest Violation of the United Nations
Charter Under Article 8bis?
Article 8bis(1) states that, for individual criminal liability to arise from
an act of aggression, that act must “by its character, gravity and scale,
constitute[] a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”102
While the text gives some indication as to what factors a judge should
assess in concluding that a violation is “manifest”—the character, gravity,
and scale of the attack—it does not indicate what level of each factor makes
for a manifest violation. In other words, where does the “manifest”
threshold lie along the gradient from small-scale border skirmishes to fullout war? The only guidance given to a judge interpreting this modifier is
found in paragraph three of Annex II to the amendments, which states
“[t]he term ‘manifest’ is an objective qualification.”103 However, this
objectivity requirement does little to clear up the vagueness of what
constitutes a manifest violation. Unfortunately, this term also draws no
support from history, as neither the United Nations Charter nor Resolution
3314 incorporates a “manifest” requirement into their definitions.104 Thus,
in the history of the work on aggression, the notion of a “manifest
violation” is new and, consequently, has drawn criticism for its
abstraction.105 As a result, judges at the ICC left with determining what
constitutes a manifest violation will likely be forced to determine the
threshold themselves.
Yet, evidence in the supplements to the text of the amendments,
coupled with the overall mission of the ICC itself, indicates that the
manifest threshold will be construed as a high one. In other words, a judge
101. See HARRY S. TRUMAN RESEARCH INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEACE, THE HEBREW
UNIV., RELIGIOUS RADICALISM AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 1 (Emmanuel Sivan & Menachem
Friedman eds., 1990) (stating that the emergence of radical religious extremism in the Middle East has a
significant impact on politics in the region).
102. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(1).
103. Id. at Annex II, art. 8bis(3).
104. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 726.
105. Id.
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faced with determining whether a violation is “manifest” will likely
interpret this term to include only a narrow category of the gravest acts of
aggression. First, any judge faced with this dilemma will likely look to
Canada’s Understanding 7, which states that “the three components of
character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’
determination. No one component can be significant enough to satisfy the
manifest standard by itself.”106 By requiring a combination of at least two
of these components,107 the delegations drafting the Understandings
exempted perpetrators of violations that only satisfy one criterion.
Furthermore, Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute reads “[t]he jurisdiction of
the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole.”108 Given that the act of aggression in
question must satisfy at least two of the criteria of character, gravity, and
scale to a sufficient degree and that the crime of aggression itself must be
one of “the most serious” of all crimes of aggression for the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction, it is likely that “manifest” will be interpreted to
include only those situations where the violation of the United Nations
Charter is so blatant that it is readily distinguishable by the reasonable
observer.
3. What Mens Rea Element Must Be Satisfied by a Leader to Merit
Prosecution for the Crime of Aggression?
Specifically in common law jurisdictions, it is often required that, to
be found guilty, the accused must have possessed the requisite mental state,
or mens rea, enumerated in the definition of the crime.109 However, Article
8bis lacks any indication of what mens rea requirement must be fulfilled by
a leader to have engaged in the crime of aggression.110 Unlike Article 6’s
definition of genocide,111 this crime does not require special intent on the
part of the perpetrator to commit the crime, which could lead to significant
confusion when attempting to assess whether the person was planning,

106. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex III, para. 7 (emphasis added).
107. Some have criticized the wording of this last sentence as it makes it unclear as to whether all
three components must be present for there to be a manifest violation, or if it can be satisfied with only
two. Heinsch, supra note 12 at 728. Either way, a judge interpreting this understanding will likely
acknowledge that the drafters intend for the language to exclude lesser acts of aggression that might
only satisfy one condition.
108. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
109. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (1993).
110. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 732.
111. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 6 (stating that to be considered genocide, the act must be
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”).
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preparing, initiating, or executing a manifest violation of the United
Nations Charter.112
However, by assessing the definition in relation to both its own
supplements and the Rome Statute itself, judges at the ICC will likely
determine that the mens rea requirement is one of intent or knowledge.113
First, because the actual definition lacks this fundamental component of
criminal law, it is safe to assume that the drafters intended the mens rea
requirement of the crime of aggression to be governed by the general mens
rea provision found in Article 30 of the Rome Statute. Article 30 states that
“[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if
the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.”114 It
further defines intent to include circumstances where the person “means to
engage in the conduct” or “means to cause that consequence or is aware
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”115 Likewise, it defines
knowledge as an “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”116 Given the clause “unless
otherwise provided,” Article 30 contemplates that the drafters of the
different crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction might intentionally leave the
mens rea requirement blank in order for it to be covered by this default
clause.
Similarly, the amendments to Article 8bis make it all the more
apparent that the drafters at Kampala intended for Article 30’s default
provision to apply. First, paragraphs two and four of Annex II to the
amendments state “[t]here is no requirement to prove that the perpetrator
has made a legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed force was
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” and “[t]here is no
requirement to prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to
the ‘manifest’ nature of the violation of the Charter of the United Nations,”
respectively.117 These provisions nullify any “mistake of law” defense that
the accused might raise; simply because the accused was not aware of the
fact that his actions were legally inconsistent with the UN Charter or that
his actions constituted a “manifest” violation does not preclude him from

112. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis.
113. This is to say that one must either intend, or act for the purpose of bringing about, a result or
have knowledge, that is know or reasonably believe, that his actions will lead to a certain result. Rollin
M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 911, 921 (1939).
114. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30 (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex II, art. 8bis (emphasis added).
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prosecution. Instead, Annex II indicates that, to be liable for the crime of
aggression, the perpetrator must be “aware of the factual circumstances
that established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations” and must be “aware of the factual
circumstances that established such a manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations,” respectively.118 These amendments, echoing the term
“awareness” from Article 30, indicate that knowledge of the factual
circumstances surrounding the act of aggression is the dispositive factor in
a mens rea analysis.119
However, the use of Article 30 as a default does present a problem
unique to the crime of aggression; in both its definition of “intent” and
“knowledge” Article 30 states that, to be liable, an individual must either
be aware of the consequences of his actions or aware of the fact that the
consequences “will occur in the ordinary course of events.”120 This
presumption that a consequence will occur in the “ordinary course of
events” proves problematic for a crime where there is no established
ordinary course of events. While waging an aggressive war was considered
a crime in World War II,121 humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was
not.122 Scholars, however, have addressed this concern by remarking that
the mens rea requirement must be read along with the term “manifest
violation” in Article 8bis.123 In doing so, it becomes evident that good-faith
errors124 do not fall under the mens rea requirement because, if the action
were taken in good-faith, the actor would not likely expect his actions to
constitute a manifest violation in the ordinary course of events.125 Instead,
while the actor need not legally determine whether his action is a manifest
violation or inconsistent with the Charter, this theory posits that the
perpetrator needs to display malicious intent or, at a minimum, a conscious

118. Id. (emphasis added). This differentiation suggests that the perpetrator must be aware that his
actions actually occurred and led to the resulting consequences but not that his actions would be illegal
or a manifest violation under the UN Charter.
119. See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 732-33.
120. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 30(2).
121. See Trahan, supra note 7, at 50.
122. See Klinton W. Alexander, NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating
Yugoslavia’s National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L.
403, 449 (2000) (stating that the NATO intervention was in accordance with customary international
law).
123. Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Permanent Representative to the U.N. & the Assembly of States
Parties for the Union Internationale des Avocats, Address at The Road From Kampala Conference: An
Analysis of the First ICC Review Conference of the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), available at
http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts (part 1).
124. This is to say, actions that resulted in a manifest violation but were done in good faith.
125. Bertram-Nothnagel, supra note 123.
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apathy as to the lawfulness of his actions in order to satisfy the mens rea
requirement.126 In this sense, the results of World War II and Kosovo can
be squared with the mens rea requirement found in the crime of aggression
amendments. The Nazi acts of aggression during World War II were in
direct violation of non-aggression treaties127 and therefore, in the least,
constituted apathy for the law. However, the actions taken by NATO in
Kosovo, which the NATO forces claimed to be consistent with United
Nations Security Council Resolutions,128 arguably, fall under the good-faith
error category. However, this is not to say that all actions taken under the
auspices of humanitarian intervention will be saved from the crime of
aggression; only those acts of aggression that – on the facts of the case –
can accurately be determined as good faith efforts for the sake of
humanitarianism will be exempt from the mens rea requirement.
4. Is the List of Acts of Aggression an Exhaustive List of those Acts
that Will Trigger a Potential Crime of Aggression?
Paragraph two of Article 8bis lists seven actions that shall be
considered acts of aggression “in accordance with United Nations General
Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.”129 While these
enumerated acts are replicated verbatim from Article 3 of the General
Assembly Resolution,130 the definition does not discuss the possibility of
other situations falling under the category of acts of aggression. This
omission begs the question as to whether the drafters intended to limit the
acts that constitute aggression to those enumerated on the list or if they
intended to use these acts as a set of most common examples that are listed
only for the purpose of guiding judges at the ICC in their own
determinations.
While the text of Article 8bis is unclear in this regard, it does provide
a clue in requiring that the acts shall be considered aggressive if such a
determination is made “in accordance” with Resolution 3314.131 Article 4
of Resolution 3314 states “[t]he acts enumerated [in Article 3] are not
exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.”132 Arguably, the
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact (Jan. 26, 1934), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk01.asp.
128. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1,
12 (1999).
129. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2).
130. Compare id., with Definition of Aggression, supra note 71, art. 3.
131. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2).
132. Definition of Aggression, supra note 71, art. 4.
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fact that an act of aggression with regard to Article 8bis is to be determined
“in accordance” with Resolution 3314 indicates that it will be determined
in accordance with Article 4 as well. Following this logic, the acts
enumerated in Article 8bis are therefore also non-exhaustive. However, if
one accepts this line of reasoning, further analysis must be conducted;
would a judge then be limited to only those non-enumerated acts that were
determined by the Security Council as to “constitute aggression under the
provisions of the Charter?”133 On the face of the text, yes; however, in
considering the fear of numerous States Parties regarding the jurisdictional
independence of the ICC from the Security Council,134 one might contend
that the drafters did not intend to read in the right of the Security Council to
determine which acts constitute aggression under the Rome Statute. In fact,
Articles 15bis and 15ter both state that “[a] determination of an act of
aggression by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the
Court’s own findings under this Statute.”135 Instead, one might infer that a
determination made “in accordance with” Resolution 3314 need not follow
the specific rules outlined in its articles but simply be consistent with the
resolution’s object and purpose.
Furthermore, regardless of a judge’s position on the Security Council
primacy issue, the Court would still be faced with another problem if it
interpreted the list laid out in Article 8bis as non-exhaustive: the principle
of legality. This principle has been a long-standing tenet of criminal law, at
least on a national level.136 It states that, in order to prosecute an individual
for a crime, there must be a clearly defined statement of punishable acts so
as to give the accused some form of notice.137 A non-exhaustive list would
violate the principle of legality, as new acts would consistently be open to
interpretation, either by the judge or the Security Council.
Judges faced with these dilemmas will likely come to the conclusion
that, while the list is non-exhaustive, it will be mandatory, for an act not
already enumerated in Article 8bis, that the Security Council have made a
previous determination that the act in question is in fact aggressive. First,
given the political undertones of the crime of aggression, the ICC would
likely receive great criticism—merited or not—if it were to determine an
act not found on the list was one of aggression. Despite the potential for

133. Id.
134. Trahan, supra note 7, at 61.
135. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(9) and 15ter(4) (emphasis added).
136. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (“No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”).
137. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 724.
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this backlash, the text of the definition suggests that the list of acts of
aggression is an open one. Article 8bis does not expressly limit the list in
paragraph two and instead only requires that acts of aggression must be
found “in accordance with” Resolution 3314.138 Consequently, it is likely
that a judge will have the power to determine that a non-enumerated act
was one of aggression as long as, in doing so, the judge is acting in
conformity with Resolution 3314.
However, because the definition does not specify as to which
subsections of Resolution 3314 judges must consider, these determinations
will probably have to be in accordance with the entire resolution, including
Article 4. To do so, judges will have to square Article 4 of Resolution 3314
with Articles 15bis and 15ter’s reference to the fact that another organ’s
“determination of an act of aggression” does not prejudice the Court’s own
determination.139 This distinction can be made by differentiating a
determination as to whether an act of aggression has occurred from a
determination as to what constitutes an act of aggression. In making an
Article 4 decision, the Security Council would not be determining if an act
of aggression has occurred but rather deciding on what characteristics
actually constitute an aggressive act.140 Although rather nuanced, there is a
distinction between the two; a determination of an act of aggression implies
that an actual situation has occurred and the deciding body, whether the
Court or the Security Council, is applying the definition for an act of
aggression to the situation. Instead, a decision as to what constitutes an act
of aggression is a theoretical one and therefore can be made in the absence
of any actual situation. For example, if the Russians launch a cyber-attack
on Georgia, under Article 4, the Security Council could assess the situation
and decide that all cyber-attacks of this nature constitute acts of aggression
under Resolution 3314. This decision would expand the definition and, as a
result, the ICC could then claim jurisdiction over any cyber-attacks that
constitute the requirements of the Security Council’s determination. The
Security Council could then determine that this specific cyber-attack, from
Russia to Georgia, is an act of aggression in its own right. It is here that
Articles 15bis and 15ter allow for the ICC to make an unprejudiced
determination; while the Security Council’s decision that a cyber-attack
constitutes an act of aggression allows for the Court to take on the RussianGeorgian situation, the Security Council’s determination that an act of
aggression actually occurred in Georgia does not mean that the ICC needs

138. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis(2).
139. See id. at Annex I, arts. 15bis(9) and 15ter(4).
140. See id.; see also Definition of Aggression, supra note 71, art. 4.
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to determine the same. Instead, the ICC is free to exercise its jurisdiction
over this new act of aggression as it sees fit.
This analysis still leaves the principle of legality dilemma. Yet the
open list in Article 8bis, while troubling on a national level with regard to
this principle, is not as much of an issue in the international realm. Both the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia
and the Rome Statute itself have areas where “open” clauses arise,
indicating – to some degree – that this is an acceptable practice in
international criminal law.141 Yet what might be acceptable for other crimes
might not be as easy to swallow for the crime of aggression given its
political nature. For this reason, it is likely that judges will limit themselves
to the Security Council restriction in Article 4 of Resolution 3314. In this
way the drafters will be interpreting the amendment “narrowly and ejusdem
generis142 with the existing list.”143 In doing so, judges will ensure that any
act of aggression that falls outside of the enumerated list has been rightfully
characterized as one by the Security Council, the international political
institution responsible for making a decision as to what constitutes an act of
aggression.144 As a result, the judges of the ICC will remove themselves
from the political nature of the determination of an act of aggression and
instead be able to focus in the actual crime itself.
B. Questions Surrounding Articles 15bis and 15ter and the Entry in Force
and Exercise of Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression
1. When Do the Crime of Aggression Amendments Enter into Force
and Over Whom Do They Grant the Court Jurisdiction?
The entry into force mechanism for the crime of aggression
amendments was a topic of heated debate at the Kampala conference.145
The final structure of the amendments indicates that they must enter into
force under Article 121(5), which allows the Court to exercise jurisdiction
over a State one year after it ratifies the amendments.146 In addition, the
amendments stipulate that a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States
141. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 724-25 (indicating that the ICTY statute’s definition of violations
of the laws of war states “[s]uch violations shall include, but not be limited to” while the Rome
Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity in Article 7(1)(k) allows for the prosecution of “other
inhumane acts of similar character” to those enumerated).
142. Meaning “of the same class.”
143. Clark, supra note 19, at 696.
144. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression . . . .”).
145. Trahan, supra note 7, at 84-85. The approval vote must be taken at least one year after thirty
states ratify the amendment and cannot be taken any earlier than January 1, 2017. Id.
146. See The Amendments, supra note 70, para. 1.
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Parties must reapprove the amendments at least one year after thirty states
have ratified them, but no earlier than January 1, 2017, before they may
enter into force.147 Some commentators have found these additional
requirements puzzling; if the amendments are so explicit about entering
into force in accordance with Article 121(5), should not the amendments
enter into force once the requirements of Article 121(5) have been
satisfied? If so, what purpose do these extra restrictions serve? At least
some scholars have suggested that this dual entry into force mechanism
implies that one set of criteria is for ratifying States Parties only and the
other set is for all States Parties, whether they ratify the amendments or
not.148 According to this theory, the amendments will enter into force
immediately for those States Parties that deposit ratifications in accordance
with Article 121(5) and that, upon achieving thirty ratifications and a twothirds majority after 2017, the amendments will enter into force for all
States Parties.149
Despite the potential for this interpretation, it is likely that the judges
of the ICC will determine that both entry into force procedures will be
necessary for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over any States Parties,
whether it has ratified the amendments or not. First, one can decipher from
the wording of Articles 15bis and 15ter that the drafters intended to give
the Court jurisdiction only upon the satisfaction of these extra restrictions.
The amendments state “[t]he Court may exercise jurisdiction only with
respect to crimes of aggression committed one year” after the deposit of
thirty ratifications.150 Furthermore, the amendments also state that the
Court “shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in
accordance with this article, subject to a decision to be taken after 1
January 2017” by a two-thirds majority.151 The use of “only” and “subject
to” in these clauses seems to indicate that drafters intended that the
amendments should not go into force for any State, regardless of
ratification, until these two requirements were fulfilled.
Practically speaking, this interpretation makes sense as well. First, the
delay period built into the amendments by these extra hurdles allows for
scholarly work to address the questions that remain in the text and posit
interpretations that can then be assessed by judges before they need to
make final determinations. Similarly, the delay period gives the legislators
of the ratifying States Parties time to develop new criminal laws to fall in
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(2)-(3).
Heinsch, supra note 12, at 737.
Id.
The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2) (emphasis added).
Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(3) and 15ter(3) (emphasis added).
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line with the amendments.152 As the ICC is a court of complementarity,153 it
cannot exercise its jurisdiction if a national court has begun a “genuine”
investigation into the matter.154 This delay period gives States an adequate
time frame within which to establish their laws and procedures for an
investigation into a crime of aggression if they so choose. Likewise, having
only come into power in 2002, the ICC is still a court very much in its
infancy; in fact, it has yet to even complete its first trial.155 This delay
period provides the Court with the opportunity to finish a case and build its
legitimacy as an international institution before exercising jurisdiction over
a politically infused crime like the crime of aggression.156 For both these
practical reasons, as well as textual ones, a judge will likely determine that
the amendments have not entered into force for any States Parties until this
delay mechanism is satisfied.
2. How Does the Entry into Force of the Crime of Aggression
Amendments Under Article 121(5) Fit with the Court’s Jurisdiction Under
Article 12?
In both Articles 15bis and 15ter it is stated that the Court may exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with Article 12.157
Article 12(1) states that “[a] State which becomes a Party to this Statute
thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes
referred to in article 5.”158 Article 12(2) further states that the Court’s
jurisdiction is triggered if the “territory of which the conduct in question
occurred” is that of a State Party or “the person accused of the crime is a
152. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 738.
153. As a court of complementarity, the ICC may only assume jurisdiction over a situation if the
national courts of the country in which it occurred are unable or unwilling to investigate the crime. In
this way, the ICC “complements” national courts. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, at preamble
(“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions . . . .”) and art. 17 (“. . . the court shall determine that a
case is inadmissible where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction
over it . . . .”).
154. Id. art. 17. The term genuine “connotes a certain basic level of objective quality.” A genuine
investigation is defined as one in which a State is both willing and able to provide an adequate
investigation and subsequent prosecution. See ICC OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INFORMAL EXPERT
PAPER: THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN PRACTICE at 8 (2003), http://www.icccpi.int/library/organs/otp/complementarity.pdf.
155. The Court’s first case commenced in 2009 and is still ongoing. See Democratic Republic of
Congo: ICC-01/04-01/06–Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+
ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0106/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm (last visited
April 8, 2011).
156. See Heinsch, supra note 12, at 738.
157. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2).
158. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(1).
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national” of a State Party.159 Articles 15bis and 15ter go on to provide an
exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction, under Article 12, for States Parties
that ratify the amendments and then lodge a declaration opting out.160
However, Article 12 still poses a dilemma for States Parties that decide not
to ratify the amendments at all. A State Party that has ratified the Rome
Statute has already ratified Article 12 and therefore given the ICC
jurisdiction, with respect to its territory and nationals, over the crimes in
Article 5, including the crime of aggression, which is mentioned in Article
5(2).161 However, as previously mentioned, the crime of aggression
amendments indicate in paragraph one that they enter into force in
accordance with Article 121(5).162 According to the second sentence of
Article 121(5), if that same State Party does not ratify the crime of
aggression amendments “the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction” over
its “nationals or on its territory.”163 Thus, Article 12(2) appears to give the
Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression with regard to the nationals
or territory of any State Party to the Rome Statute. However, Article 121(5)
appears to allow for States Parties to refuse the Court’s jurisdiction over
this very same crime. Under this analysis, there seems to be a tension
between these two articles.
However, upon closer inspection of the articles, it is evident that this
tension does not actually exist. Article 12(2) specifically states “the Court
may exercise its jurisdiction” over a State Party164 while Article 121(5) says
“the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction” over a non-ratifying State
Party.165 The difference between the wording of these two articles indicates
that Article 121(5) (a “shall” provision) is mandatory while Article 12(2) (a
“may” provision) is permissive.166 Under Article 12, the ICC has the option
to exercise its jurisdiction for the crime of aggression over a State Party.
But, under Article 121(5), this option is removed if that State Party has not
ratified the crime of aggression amendments.167 In essence, the mandatory
provision of Article 121(5) trumps the permissive provision of Article

159. Id. art. 12(2).
160. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I art. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2).
161. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2), 12(1).
162. The Amendments, supra note 70, para. 1.
163. Id. art. 121(5).
164. Id. art. 12(2) (emphasis added).
165. Id. art. 121(5) (emphasis added).
166. Robert Manson, Kampala Review Conference Delegate for the U.K. Coal. for the ICC,
Address at The Road From Kampala Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC Review Conference of
the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts (part 3).
167. See id.
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12.168 A judge faced with this tension will likely have no problem deciding
in this manner. This construction fits perfectly with Article 5(2) which
states that “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and
123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”169 The second
half of this sentence implies that the criteria for the Court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over crime of aggression are to be found in the text of Article
121. Seeing as Article 12 derives its jurisdiction by referencing the crimes
in Article 5170 and Article 5(2) specifically references Article 121, it is easy
to interpret Article 12’s jurisdictional structure as a supplement to that
which is laid out in Article 121(5).171
3. What Is the Difference Between a State Party Refusing to Ratify the
Amendments and a State Party Ratifying but Opting Out of Them?
States Parties have two different opportunities to reject the ICC’s
jurisdiction over their nationals or territory with regard to the crime of
aggression. First, the second sentence of Article 121(5) states “[i]n respect
of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.”172 Second,
Article 15bis states that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a crime of
aggression “arising from an act of aggression committed by a State Party,
unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not accept such
jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar.”173 Thus, a State
can either not ratify the amendments or ratify them but “opt-out” of the
Court’s jurisdiction. Yet, why, if a State Party that has not ratified the
amendments is exempt from the Court’s jurisdiction, would a State Party
ever ratify the amendments and then subsequently opt-out? Does the optout provision provide a State Party with a different set of rights and
obligations from those it would retain simply by not ratifying the
amendment in the first place? Some have interpreted this opt-out provision
as an indication that all States Parties are meant to fall under the
jurisdiction of the Court once the requirements in Article 15bis are
fulfilled, namely that thirty States Parties have ratified the amendments and
168. Id.
169. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
170. See id. art. 12(1) (“A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”) (emphasis added).
171. See Manson, supra note 53, at 424-25.
172. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).
173. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).

KOSTIC 12_1_11 FINAL FIXED AT CP STAGE(DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

WHOSE CRIME IS IT ANYWAY?

12/1/2011 5:20 PM

135

a two-thirds majority votes in favor of the amendments after January 1,
2017.174 In this way, States Parties who have not ratified the amendment
will become de facto bound by it once this requirement is satisfied. Only
those States Parties that have ratified the amendment and opted out can be
assured that they will not be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.175
Here, the purpose of allowing for States Parties to either not ratify the
amendment or ratify and opt-out seems to be a practical one. As both
Articles 15bis and 15ter require thirty State Party ratifications to enter into
force, ratifications will be necessary for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction
regardless of whether the Security Council has referred the situation to the
Court or the Court has taken on the case as a result of a State Party referral
or under the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers.176 However, a State Party
might be in favor of giving the Court jurisdiction over crimes of aggression
that are referred by the Security Council while still being hesitant to allow
for the Court to exercise its power under the State Party referral and
proprio motu triggers.177 The opt-out provision, therefore, allows for a
State Party to indicate that it seeks to give the Security Council the power
to refer a situation regarding an act of aggression to the Court without
giving the Court power to take on similar situations with regard to its
territory and nationals under the other two triggers.178 This interpretation is
supported by the fact that the opt-out provision is only contained in Article
15bis, which deals with the State Party referral and proprio motu
triggers.179 By allowing for this loophole, the drafters have made it easier
for States Parties to ratify the amendments and, presumably, for the
amendments to enter into force more quickly.
Yet this analysis provides those States Parties who have ratified and
opted out an unfair advantage over those parties who chose not to ratify the
amendment at all. Article 121(5) states that the ICC cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a crime of aggression “when committed by that State
Party’s nationals or on its territory” for those States Parties that have not
ratified the amendments.180 However, the clause in Articles 15bis states
that, for States Parties that opt out of the amendments, the Court may not
174. This interpretation falls in line with an argument rejected earlier in favor of interpreting the
combination of Article 121(5) and the restrictions found in Articles 15bis and 15ter as applying to the
Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over any States Parties, including those who have ratified the
amendments. See supra Part II(B)(1) of this section.
175. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 739.
176. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(2) and 15ter(2).
177. Heinsch, supra note 12, at 739.
178. Id.
179. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, arts. 15bis(4) and 15ter.
180. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5) (emphasis added).
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exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression “arising from an act of
aggression committed by [that] State Party.”181 This differentiation seems to
indicate that, while the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over a crime of
aggression where a non-ratifying State Party is the victim (one which is “on
its territory”), it may do so for a State Party that has opted out (as it would
not have been “committed by” that State Party).182 This arrangement would
afford an opting-out State Party protection against crimes of aggression
directed toward it, while allowing the same State to claim immunity for
crimes of aggression conducted by its nationals.
While this imbalance might seem troubling, politically, it provides
motivation for States Parties to ratify the amendments; a State Party that
ratifies the amendments but opts-out of the Court’s jurisdiction preserves
its right to engage in what might be considered an aggressive act without
the potential for the prosecution of its leaders but still protects its territorial
sovereignty in case it finds itself on the other end of an aggressive act.
Though this loophole might lend itself to abuse by States Parties, it is likely
the drafters saw it as better than the alternative. Presumably, States Parties
who opt out of the amendment do so because they fear their leaders will be
prosecuted for their aggressive acts. Were they not given the opportunity to
opt out, these States Parties would likely not ratify the amendment at all to
ensure the same protection for their nationals existed under the protection
of Article 121(5).183 These lost ratifications might prevent the crime of
aggression amendments from going into force altogether. However, if
given the opportunity to have their cake and eat it too, so to speak, these
States Parties will be enticed to support the overall jurisdiction of the crime
of aggression, which will lead to a speedier entry into force. Furthermore,
the amendments provide for a reassessment of any opt-out declaration
lodged by a State Party within three years of its submission.184 This
mandatory reassessment might put political pressure on these countries to
revoke their opt-out declaration at a later date if the international
community finds that they are abusing it. Considering that the Kampala
compromises probably left few states entirely happy,185 the drafters likely
sought to entice ratifications from those States Parties that were on the
fence with regard to the amendments. While compromises, such as the optout provision, were not exactly considered desirable by all the delegates at
Kampala, they are probably necessary to obtain the number of ratifications
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).
Stahn, supra note 65, at 878.
See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).
See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).
Trahan, supra note 7, at 82.
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required for the entry into force of the crime.186 In providing these benefits
to States Parties that ratify the amendments, the drafters have made it easier
for the overall crime of aggression regime to move forward with the
support of countries that would not do so otherwise.
4. On Which State’s Territory Does a Crime of Aggression Take
Place?
While most crimes usually occur on the territorial jurisdiction of one
state, the nature of a crime of aggression—a crime that is usually launched
from one state and impacts another—makes it unclear as to where the
actual crime takes place. Seeing as the crime of aggression exempts certain
situations based on the country’s territory on which it occurs, the answer to
this question might indicate whether the Court has the jurisdiction to
prosecute a case or not. The definition indicates that acts of aggression
usually take place in the victim state.187 Following this logic, for
jurisdictional purposes, the crime of aggression should occur in the victim’s
territory. However, according to Article 8bis(1) the actual crime committed
is the “planning, preparation, initiation or execution” done by a leader.188
Following this logic, the acts that constitute the crime will likely take place
in the territory of the aggressor.189 This dual-territoriality poses an
interesting problem when a ratifying State Party commits an act of
aggression on either a non-State Party or on a non-ratifying State Party. For
a non-ratifying State Party, Article 121(5) exempts crimes of aggression
committed on its territory from the jurisdiction of the Court.190 For a nonState Party, the amendments exempt crimes of aggression that occur on its
territory.191 However, given that the planning, preparation, or initiation
usually occurs on the territory of the aggressor state, a judge might interpret
that the aggressor’s territory is applicable for a determination of
jurisdiction, not the victims. If the aggressor is a ratifying State Party, this
territorial determination might grant the Court jurisdiction over the offense,

186. See Astrid Reisinger Coracini, Professor at the Institute of Int’l Law & Int’l Relations of the
Univ. of Graz & Exec. Dir. of the Salzburg Law Sch. on Int’l Criminal Law, Humanitarian Law &
Human Rights Law, Address at The Road From Kampala Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC
Review Conference of the Rome Statute (Nov. 13, 2010), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/
webcast/#webcasts (part 3).
187. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 8bis (2) (stating that acts of aggression
include, inter alia, the “invasion,” “bombardment,” and “use of armed forces” by one state within “the
territory of another state”).
188. Id. at Annex I, art. 8bis (1).
189. See Clark, supra note 19, at 705.
190. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5).
191. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(5).

KOSTIC 12_1_11 FINAL FIXED AT CP STAGE (DO NOT DELETE)

138

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/1/2011 5:20 PM

[Vol 22:109

even though the actual result was felt on the territory of either a non-State
Party or a non-ratifying State Party.
Despite the creativity of this legal argument, a judge will likely
interpret the notion of territoriality narrowly: both the victim State and the
aggressor State must have ratified the amendments for the Court to be able
to exercise jurisdiction over the situation. This interpretation is consistent
with the rule of effect and the idea of “objective territorial jurisdiction” and
further seems to be the case with the other crimes under the ICC’s
mandate.192 On a practical level, given that the Court is in its infancy, it is
also likely that it will not want to jeopardize the development of its
legitimacy by exercising jurisdiction, even if it is only partial jurisdiction,
over the territory of a State that has not ratified the amendments. This
action would further be in contravention of the notion of sovereignty,
which is recognized under the United Nations Charter, a document that is
acknowledged consistently throughout the crime of aggression
amendments.193 Likewise, given the fact that the drafters provided two
different means by which States Parties could avoid the Court’s jurisdiction
with regard to the crime of aggression,194 it would seem contradictory for a
judge to then exercise jurisdiction over these States Parties or non-States
Parties through a backdoor mechanism.
5. What Acts Must Be Taken by the Security Council to Constitute a
“Determination” Under Article 15bis?
The role of the Security Council in determining whether an act of
aggression has occurred was one of the most contentious and important
issues at Kampala.195 To appease both sides of this argument, the drafters
of the amendments instituted a provision making the Court’s ability to
exercise jurisdiction contingent on whether or not the Security Council has
made a “determination.”196 However, the text of the amendments does not
define what a Security Council determination actually entails. Furthermore,
while the text indicates what the ICC can do in the case of a positive
determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression has

192. Clark, supra note 19, at 705.
193. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; see generally The Amendments, supra note 70 (referencing
the U.N. Charter several times).
194. These two means are refusing to ratify the amendments or opting out of them. See Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 121(5); see also The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(4).
195. See Marcelo Bohlke, Legal Advisor & Sixth Comm. Delegate for the Permanent Mission for
Braz. to the U.N., The Road From Kampala Conference: An Analysis of the First ICC Review
Conference of the Rome Statute, part 2 (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/#webcasts.
196. See The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(6)-(8).
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occurred197 and has indicated what it must do in the case that the Security
Council has not made a determination at all,198 it does not speak as to what
happens when the Security Council has made a negative determination, or
one in which it deems that an act of aggression has not occurred.199 Article
15bis(9) does say “[a] determination of an act of aggression by an organ
outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings
under this Statute.”200 Yet it seems redundant then to emphasize the waiting
period that must occur if the Security Council has made no determination
when, if the Security Council ends up making a negative determination, it
would have no effect on the Prosecutor’s investigation whatsoever.
Given the concerns voiced at Kampala over the Security Council’s
potential infringement on the ICC’s independence, it is no surprise that
Article 15bis does not prevent an investigation from occurring if the
Security Council makes a negative determination. While some delegates
would have preferred this course,201 providing the Security Council total
control was criticized by the vast majority of the delegations at Kampala
and could have led to a failure to garner a consensus.202 Furthermore, if the
Security Council were to seek to prevent ICC prosecution, it is not without
options; Article 16 of the Rome Statute reads:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with
under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in
a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be
renewed by the Council under the same conditions.203

While this measure is only temporary, it does provide the Security
Council with the opportunity to halt an investigation in hopes of giving the
two parties to the dispute the chance to continue negotiations on their
own.204
Yet this answer still does not define what the amendments actually
mean when they mention a Security Council “determination.” Instead, a
judge seeking to define “determination” will have to look to the past
197. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(7).
198. Id. at Annex I, art. 15bis(8).
199. David Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression Under the Rome Statute, 23 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 897, 901 (2010) (Neth.).
200. The Amendments, supra note 70, at Annex I, art. 15bis(9).
201. See Scheffer, supra note 199, at 902.
202. See Kreß & von Holtzendorff, supra note 22, at 1194.
203. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 16.
204. See Scheffer, supra note 199, at 902.
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interaction between the ICC and the Security Council as well as the Rome
Statute itself. In doing so, a judge will likely construe “determination”
narrowly, that is to say, to include only formal resolutions offered by the
Security Council. Under Article 13(b), the Court may exercise jurisdiction
if “[a] situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been
committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”205 So far, any
Article 13(b) referrals from the Security Council have come in the form of
a formal resolution.206 While a formal resolution might seem more difficult
to obtain, especially given that three of the permanent five members
wielding vetoes on the Security Council are non-States Parties,207 the fact
that the Prosecutor may engage in an investigation regardless of the
Security Council determination means that, were the Security Council to
refuse to present a formal resolution referring the situation, the Prosecutor
would only need to wait six months to arrange for an investigation under
his proprio motu powers. On the contrary, requiring a formal resolution to
trigger a Security Council referral ensures that the Prosecutor does not
jump the gun with regard to these six months when the Security Council
has not come to a formal agreement.
CONCLUSION
The crime of aggression amendments passed at the Kampala Review
Conference were a historic achievement in the development of the
International Criminal Court. Though the text of the amendments has led to
questions regarding the elements of the crime and the ICC’s exercise of
jurisdiction over it, it is evident from this analysis that appropriate
interpretations can be formulated by reading it in conjunction with the
Rome Statute and with regard to the current state of the Court itself. With
potential trials for crimes of aggression delayed until at least 2017, more
analysis must be done in the upcoming years as the Court grows as an
institution to determine the appropriate means by which the amendments
should be interpreted. Once the Court has gained jurisdiction over the
crime, the development of precedent will eventually provide an
understanding that will be more easily applied to each situation it faces.

205. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b).
206. See generally S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26 2011); see also S.C. Res. 1593,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
207. Those three are China, Russia, and the United States. See U.N. Charter art. 23; see also The
States Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).
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Until that day, however, it is up to scholars, critics, and diplomats to begin
this discussion.
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